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In a model of spatial competition, we analyze the equilibrium outcomes in
markets where the product price is exogenous. Using an extended version
of the Hotelling model, we assume that firms choose their locations and the
quality of the product they supply. We derive the optimal price set by a
welfarist regulator. If the regulator can commit to a price prior to the choice
of locations, the optimal (second-best) price causes overinvestment in quality
and an insufficient degree of horizontal differentiation (compared with the
first-best solution) if the transportation cost of consumers is sufficiently high.
Under partial commitment, where the regulator is not able to commit prior
to location choices, the optimal price induces first-best quality, but horizontal
differentiation is inefficiently high.
1. Introduction
In this paper we study the strategic interaction between horizontal
differentiation and the supply of quality in markets that are subject to
price regulation. Imperfect competition does not generally guarantee an
optimal supply of quality or locational efficiency. This could provide a
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rationale for regulation. In the present paper we characterize the optimal
regulated price in markets where firms compete along both vertical and
horizontal dimensions.
It is well known that the market cannot always be relied upon
to supply a socially efficient level of product quality. This is illus-
trated within a monopoly framework in a seminal paper by Spence
(1975).1 Introducing competition between firms, Ma and Burgess (1993)
identify another potential inefficiency caused by the strategic interac-
tion between quality and price competition that will generally lead
to suboptimal product quality. When quality and price decisions are
made sequentially, firms will underinvest in quality to dampen price
competition. A regulator can then make the firms commit to a higher
level of product quality by eliminating price competition.
In imperfectly competitive markets, though, an important part of
the strategic interaction among firms also takes place along a spatial
dimension. It is well known that the location choices of firms, interpreted
in either geographical space or product space, are highly dependent
on whether or not prices are regulated. For instance, Anderson and
Engers (1994) show that price-taking firms will agglomerate at the
market center in a spatial duopoly if demand is sufficiently inelastic, a
result that corresponds with Hotelling’s (1929) prediction of minimum
differentiation.2 On the other hand, if firms are allowed to compete
in prices they can reduce competition by locating further apart. In
another seminal contribution, D’Aspremont et al. (1979) show that,
under certain conditions, price competition induces the firms to locate
at either extreme of the Hotelling line, a result often referred to as the
“Principle of Maximum Differentiation.” From a welfare point of view,
it is clear that neither location at the market center nor location at the
market borders is desirable.
The case of location-quality competition has received relatively
little attention in the literature, and is therefore less understood. The
purpose of this paper is to examine the interaction between location and
quality choices made by competing firms facing a fixed product price,
and to explore welfare implications and optimal regulation of prices in
such markets. We do so by employing a model where two firms choose
location (or specialization) of their product on the “unconstrained”
Hotelling line prior to investment decisions that affect the quality of the
1. The incentive to provide quality is related to the marginal willingness to pay for
quality, for the marginal consumer in the case of a profit-maximizing firm, and for the
average consumer in the case of a social planner. Depending on the difference between
the consumers’ marginal and average valuations, the supply of quality may be higher or
lower than the social optimum.
2. In a related paper, Hinloopen (2002) analyzes the location choices of firms in a price-
regulated spatial duopoly where consumers’ reservation prices may bind in equilibrium.
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product offered. A welfarist regulator sets the price of the product (or
the third-party payment) at a stage that either precedes or immediately
follows the locational decisions, depending on the level of regulatory
commitment.
A prime example of where the situation analyzed in this paper
applies is the health care market. In response to the peculiarities of
medical services or, more generally, health goods, compensation of
health care suppliers is, in most countries, set by some regulatory
authority. In the absence of price as a strategic variable, health care
suppliers will resort to other variables to attract patients. Considering
the hospital market, the management at a hospital has (at least) two
important strategic decisions to make. First, they have to decide what
services or treatments the hospital should offer. For example, should
they specialize in care for cardiac or oncology patients? Second, the
management must decide on the quality of the services provided. This
decision involves investments in medical equipment (e.g., CT scanners),
contracts with highly skilled physicians, etc. Both decisions are likely
not only to affect the hospital’s costs, but also its demand and, in turn,
the payments the hospitals receive from the regulator. Consequently,
hospitals will set quality (vertical differentiation) and specialization
(horizontal differentiation) strategically.3, 4
Another relevant example is the market for (especially higher)
education. Consider an educational market where tuition fees play a
negligible role, and the funding of educational institutions is correlated
with student attendances. This applies to many European countries in
particular. In such markets there are essentially two different concerns
that are important for a potential student’s choice of educational estab-
lishment (school): the quality and the (horizontal) characteristics of the
schooling offered. The quality aspect could be anything from the quality
of lecturers to the range of library services, whereas the horizontal
characteristics are typically related to the range and types of courses
offered. It is thus reasonable to believe that schools will make strategic
decisions, in terms of vertical and horizontal differentiation, in order to
attract students.
Our main findings are the following: first, a higher price will
increase the equilibrium level of quality, but it will also induce the firms
3. The horizontal dimension could also be interpreted in the geographical sense.
Consider two hospitals providing the same quality of care. A patient would then simply
consult the hospital closer to where he lives.
4. The market for prescription drugs may also serve as an example. In such markets
prices are usually regulated and patients are reimbursed a substantial share of the med-
ication expenditures. Moreover, pharmaceuticals are often vertically (e.g., “perceived”
therapeutic value) and horizontally (e.g., chemical substance) differentiated, capturing
both branded versus generics and branded versus branded competition.
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to locate further apart. The higher the price-cost margin, the higher the
benefits, in terms of profits, of capturing a larger share of the market, and
this induces the firms to compete more intensively on quality. However,
firms have then an incentive to locate further apart in order to dampen
quality competition.
We characterize the optimal regulatory policy under two alterna-
tive assumptions about the sequence of moves. Under full commitment,
where the regulator sets a price at the outset of the game, the optimal
(second-best) price causes overinvestment in quality and an insufficient
degree of differentiation, compared with the first-best outcome, if the
transportation cost of consumers is sufficiently high. This outcome is
contrasted with the case of partial commitment, where the regulator is
not able to commit to a price prior to the firms’ locational decisions. In
this case—which corresponds well with a geographical interpretation of
firm location—optimal regulation induces first-best quality provision,
but excessive differentiation.
This paper relates to the following literature: the paper by Ma
and Burgess (1993) shows that price regulation reduces inefficiencies in
the provision of quality in a spatial duopoly. Wolinsky (1997) extends
the former study, both in terms of optimal market regime (managed
competition versus regulated monopolies) and asymmetric informa-
tion. However, in both studies locations are exogenous, and thus the
interaction between quality and location is not investigated.
Economides (1989) considers both quality and location choices
under price competition, and Bester (1998) analyzes the effect of
imperfect information about quality on firms’ location choices in a
similar model. Price regulation, however, is not an issue in either
paper.
Two other related papers applied to health care markets are
Gravelle (1999) and Nuscheler (2003). In both cases, though, attention is
directed toward entry of firms in a circular model, which means that the
distance between firms is determined by the number of firms entering
the market, so the focus of these papers is quite different from the present
one in this respect. Finally, in a paper applied specifically to the hospital
market, Calem and Rizzo (1995) consider the interaction between loca-
tion and quality choices under the assumption that hospitals cover a
fraction of their patients’ transportation costs. This paper differs from
ours in two important ways, though. First, they do not consider optimal
regulation, which is a major issue in the present paper. Second, the very
particular assumptions in their model reduce its applicability beyond
hospital markets.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2
we present the main ingredients of the model. In Section 3 we analyze
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the strategic relationship between quality and location choices when
the firms face an exogenous product price. In Section 4 we derive the
optimal regulated price and the corresponding equilibrium outcome
under full commitment, whereas the case of partial commitment is
analyzed in Section 5. In Section 6 we briefly discuss the impact of
unequal welfare weights on the outcome of the commitment game.
Finally, some concluding remarks are offered in Section 7.
2. The Model
A unit mass of consumers is distributed uniformly on the line segment
[0, 1]. Each of two identical single-product firms, indexed by i = 1, 2,
chooses a location xi and a quality level qi ≥ 0. In order to secure the
existence of pure-strategy equilibria throughout the analysis, we make
the following assumptions about the firms’ choice sets in the location
game: firm 1 chooses a location x1 ∈ [0, 12 − x¯], whereas firm 2 chooses
x2 ∈ [ 12 + x¯, 1], where x¯ is a (small) positive number. This means that the
firms cannot locate too close to each other. Both firms charge the same
exogenous (regulated) price p for the product.5
Each consumer demands one unit of the good. The utility derived
by a consumer located at z from getting a unit of the product from firm
i is given by
U(z, xi , qi ) = v + qi − t(z − xi )2 − p. (1)
This utility specification implies that consumers always prefer higher
quality. We assume that the gross utility, v + qi, is always large enough
for the whole market to be covered, even at qi = 0. Given that v is
assumed to be equal for all consumers, and that the two firms charge the
same price, the location z¯ of the consumer who is indifferent between
buying the product from either firm is the solution to
q1 − t(z¯ − x1)2 = q2 − t(x2 − z¯)2 (2)
and is given by
z¯ = 1
2
(x1 + x2) + q1 − q22t(x2 − x1) . (3)
5. Alternatively, we can think of this as the payment transferred from a third party (e.g.,
an insurer or a governmental agency) to the firms. The analytical exposition is simplified
by considering a single price for both firms. Due to the symmetric nature of the model,
the equilibrium outcome is obviously not affected by this simplification.
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Let yi be the total demand facing firm i. With a uniform distribution
of consumers, the distribution of market shares between the two firms
is given by y1 = z¯ and y2 = 1 − z¯.
The marginal cost of production, denoted c, is assumed to be
constant and independent of locations. The cost of achieving a quality
level qi is given by a cost function K(qi).6 We make the following
assumptions on K:
(1) K′(·) > 0, K′′(·) > 0, K(0) = K′(0) = 0.
(2) [K′′(·)]2 − K′(·)K′′′(·) ≥ 0.
The assumptions in (1) are standard. Assumption (2) secures
equilibrium existence in the location game. This assumption holds for
any function of the type K(q) = kqn; k > 0, n > 1.
The profit of firm i is thus7
πi = (p − c)yi − K (qi ), i = 1, 2. (4)
For the main part of the analysis, we consider the following three-
stage game:
 Stage 1: The regulator sets a price p.
 Stage 2: The firms simultaneously choose locations x1 and x2.
 Stage 3: The firms simultaneously choose the quality levels q1 and q2.
This sequence of moves relies on the assumption that the regulator
is able to precommit to a regulatory policy. This assumption could
be justified by a reputation argument. Commitment could also be
obtained by creating institutional mechanisms that make it costly, or
otherwise difficult, to change the regulated price. In Section 5 we will
contrast the results derived from the above specified game with the
case of partial commitment, where the regulator is not able to commit
to a price prior to location decisions. In either case we assume that
choice of location is more of a long-term decision than choice of quality
is.8
6. The assumption that the firms’ costs are separable in quality and quantity implies
that quality has the characteristics of a public good for the consumers. This is a widely
used assumption in the literature (see, e.g., Economides, 1989, 1993; Calem and Rizzo,
1995; Lyon, 1999; Gravelle and Masiero, 2000; Barros and Martinez-Giralt, 2002).
7. Note that price regulation in this setting is equivalent to regulating firms’ mark-ups.
8. When considering simultaneous location and quality decisions, then, by the same
argument as in Gabszewicz and Thisse (1992, pp. 291–292), no equilibrium in pure-
strategies exists. As we concentrate on pure-strategy equilibria throughout the paper we
neglect that particular timing.
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3. Equilibrium Qualities and Locations
We start out by deriving the Nash equilibrium outcome for a given price
p, in order to analyze how the firms’ choices of location and quality are
determined by the regulated price. As usual, the game is solved by
backward induction.
3.1 Quality Competition
We look for an equilibrium in pure strategies in the quality subgame.9
For a given pair of locations (x1, x2) and a given price p, the first-order
condition for an optimal quality level q∗i is given by
10
p − c
2t
− K ′(q ∗i ) = 0, (5)
where  := (x2 − x1) ∈ [2x¯, 1].
The first observation to be made is that the equilibrium levels of
quality depend only on relative locations, not on absolute locations.
In other words, only the distance between the firms, , matters. Thus,
the firms will always invest equally much in quality, even if they are
asymmetrically located. This is due to the absence of price competition.
When prices are exogenous, there is only a market share effect of quality
investments. By increasing the level of quality, firm i is able to capture a
larger share of the market by “pushing” the indifferent consumer in the
direction of the rival firm. Because consumers are uniformly distributed,
this effect does not depend on absolute locations.
The comparative static results are easily obtained by total differ-
entiation of the first-order condition, yielding
∂q ∗i (; ·)
∂
= − (p − c)
2t2 K ′′(·) < 0, (6)
∂q ∗i (; ·)
∂t
= − (p − c)
2t2K ′′(·) < 0, (7)
∂q ∗i (; ·)
∂p
= 1
2tK ′′(·) > 0. (8)
The optimal level of quality decreases in the distance between the
firms. This is due to the convexity of transportation costs.11 From the
9. The concept of mixed strategies does not seem to make much sense in the context
of firms’ quality investment decisions, so we disregard this possibility by assumption.
10. The second-order condition is satisfied, since K′′(·) > 0.
11. It is straightforward to show that if transportation costs were linear, firms’ quality
choice and, thus, equilibrium quality would be independent of locations (or distance),
precluding meaningful nonprice competition.
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viewpoint of either firm, the further apart the firms are located, the
smaller the market share captured by a marginal increase in quality.
Thus, differentiation softens quality competition. A similar kind of
argument applies for the negative relationship between q∗i and t. The
more costly it is for consumers to “travel,” the smaller the benefits, in
terms of increased market shares, for either firm of investing in quality
improvements. This implies that the local monopoly power of firms
increases as t increases.12 Finally, the optimal level of quality increases
with the price level, p. With the assumption of constant marginal costs,
this result is quite intuitive. The higher the price-cost margin, the higher
the benefits, in terms of profits, of capturing a larger share of the market.
Consequently, the stronger is the incentive to increase the level of quality.
Indeed, a positive price-cost margin is a necessary condition for the firms
to make quality investments at all.
In order to ensure the existence of equilibrium in the quality
subgame, it remains to be ensured that firms earn nonnegative profits for
all possible locations. For a given pair of locations (x1, x2), equilibrium
profits for firm i are given by
πi
(
x1, x2, p, q ∗i (; ·)
) = 1
2
(p − c)(x1 + x2) − K
(
q ∗i (; ·)
)
,
from which we can derive
∂πi
(
x1, x2, p, q ∗i (; ·)
)
∂p
= 1
2
(x1 + x2) − K
′(·)
K ′′(·)
1
2t
,
∂2πi
(
x1, x2, p, q ∗i (; ·)
)
∂p2
= −
[
[K ′′(·)]2 − K ′(·)K ′′′(·)
4t22[K ′′(·)]3
]
.
We see that ∂2πi/∂p2 < 0. Furthermore, using our assumptions on
K(·), it is straightforward to show that limp→cπi = 0, limp→∞πi < 0,
and limp→c(∂πi/∂p) > 0, implying that there exists a p¯ > c such that
πi(x1, x2, p, q∗i (; ·)) ≥ 0 if p ∈ [c, p¯]. Thus, equilibrium existence re-
quires an upper bound p¯ on the regulated price.
3.2 Location Choice
At stage 2 of the game, the firms simultaneously choose their locations,
anticipating the quality pair (q∗1(; ·), q∗2(; ·)) at the subsequent stage
of the game. Using (5) and (4), the first-order conditions for an interior
solution in the location game are given by
12. Note that if we use the product space interpretation of horizontal differentiation,
an increase in transportation costs can be interpreted as more heterogeneous consumer
preferences.
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∂π1
∂x1
= 1
2
(p − c)
(
1 − K
′(·)
K ′′(·)
1
t2
)
= 0, (9)
∂π2
∂x2
= −1
2
(p − c)
(
1 − K
′(·)
K ′′(·)
1
t2
)
= 0. (10)
We see that the first-order conditions are met for a unique distance, ∗,
between the firms. The interior solution is thus given by
K ′(·)
K ′′(·) = t (
∗)2 . (11)
Assuming a symmetric equilibrium, there are two possible corner solu-
tions, given by (x∗1 , x
∗
2 ) = ( 12 − x¯, 12 + x¯) and (x∗1, x∗2) = (0, 1), respectively.
It follows from (9) and (10) that the location equilibrium is a corner
solution with minimal differentiation if
K ′(·)
K ′′(·) ≤ t (2x¯)
2 , (12)
and the corner solution with maximal differentiation if
K ′(·)
K ′′(·) ≥ t. (13)
The second-order conditions are given by
∂2πi
∂x2i
= −(p − c)
(
(·) (p − c)
4t24
+ K
′(·)
K ′′(·)
1
t3
)
, i = 1, 2,
where (·) := [K ′′(·)]2 − K ′(·)K ′′′(·)[K ′′(·)]3 ≥ 0. Thus, with our assumptions on K(·),
the second-order conditions are always satisfied.
An important feature of the location-quality equilibrium is that
the presence of quality competition introduces a centrifugal force in the
location game. In the absence of quality competition, we know that
exogenous prices cause the firms to choose minimal differentiation.
However, the possibility of quality-enhancing investments introduces a
degree of competition that the firms are able partly to avoid by locating
further away from each other. From (11) we see that the strength of
this effect is partly determined by the convexity of the investment cost
function. The less convex the investment cost function is—that is, the
higher K
′(·)
K ′′(·) is—the stronger are the incentives for quality competition
for given locations. This increases the firms’ incentives to avoid quality
competition by locating further apart.
The comparative static effects of p and t on the equilibrium distance
between firms in the interior solution is obtained by total differentiation
of (11), yielding
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∂∗(·)
∂p
= (·)
∗
(·)(p − c) + 4 (∗)3 t2 > 0, (14)
∂∗(·)
∂t
= −(·)(p − c) + 2 (
∗)3 t2
t
∗
(·)(p − c) + 4 (∗)3 t2 < 0. (15)
The comparative statics results for the equilibrium levels of quality,
when location decisions are endogenized, are found by totally differ-
entiating (5) and using (14) and (15), yielding13
∂q ∗(·)
∂p
= 2t (
∗)2
(·)(p − c) + 4 (∗)3 t2
1
K ′′(·) > 0, (16)
∂q ∗(·)
∂t
= − (p − c) (
∗)2
(·)(p − c) + 4 (∗)3 t2
1
K ′′(·) < 0. (17)
The following proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 1: Both the equilibrium levels of quality and the equilibrium
distance between the firms decrease in t, and increase in p.
From the discussion in Section 3.1, we know that an increase in
the price level will, ceteris paribus, induce the firms to increase quality,
implying that the competition between the firms intensifies. The firms
have incentives to dampen this effect, though, by locating further
apart. However, Proposition 1 confirms that the latter (indirect) effect is
smaller than the former (direct) effect. Consequently, an increase in the
product price leads to increased quality in equilibrium. There are similar
mechanisms at work for the comparative statics results regarding the
transportation cost parameter t. When locations are endogenous, the
direct negative effect on quality from an increase in t is partly mitigated
by a smaller distance between the firms in equilibrium, resulting in
stronger incentives for quality investments. The overall effect, though,
is a decrease in the equilibrium levels of quality.
4. Optimal Regulation Under
Full Commitment
In this section we analyze how a regulator should optimally set the
price in this particular market. The desirability of price regulation can
arise for several reasons. Importantly, in this type of model, allowing
for price competition generally leads to both suboptimal equilibrium
13. To save notation, we use the notational shorthand q∗(·) := q∗(∗(·); ·) to denote
equilibrium quality when locations are endogenous. This convention is used throughout
the paper.
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levels of quality and socially inefficient locations, due to the strategic
interaction between the firms. This could, in itself, create a potential role
for regulation. However, we also want to treat this model as a depiction
of markets in which price regulation is viewed as desirable due to, for
example, distributional considerations, like in markets for healthcare or
education.
The vertical and horizontal dimensions of the product (quality and
locations) are assumed to be noncontractible, leaving the product price
as the only regulatory instrument.14 We assume that the regulator max-
imizes the sum of consumers’ and producers’ surpluses.15 We confine
the analysis to the case of symmetric equilibria. Imposing symmetry, and
easing notation by writing qi = q, social welfare is given by
W = v + q − t
12
+ t
4
 (1 − ) − 2K (q ) − c. (18)
4.1 The First-Best Solution
For comparative purposes, we start out by considering the socially
optimal first-best solution. With the assumption of unit demand, there
is no efficiency loss associated with a price in excess of marginal costs, so
that the only relevant variables are locations and quality. The first-order
conditions for a first-best solution are given by16
∂W
∂
= t
4
(1 − 2) = 0, (19)
∂W
∂q
= 1 − 2K ′(·) = 0. (20)
The first-best solution is characterized by a pair of locations that
minimize total transportation costs for consumers. When consumers are
uniformly distributed on the line segment [0, 1], this pair of locations is
given by ( 14 ,
3
4 ), which implies  = 12 . The first-best solution also requires
a quality level that equates marginal revenues and marginal costs.
14. Due to measurement problems related to vertical and horizontal differentiation,
these variables will typically be nonverifiable in a contractual sense.
15. If we interpret the model in the context of markets with third-party payers (typically
markets for healthcare and education), this particular specification of the welfare function
relies implicitly on the assumption that the third party (i.e., the regulator) is able to raise
the necessary funds in a nondistortionary manner.
16. The second-order conditions are satisfied, since ∂
2W
∂2
= − 12 t < 0, ∂
2W
∂q2
= −2K ′′(·) <
0, and ∂
2W
∂∂q = 0.
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4.2 The Second-Best Solution
When the regulator is not able to control locations and quality directly
but only indirectly through the price level, the equilibrium outcome
is generally expected to fall short of the first-best solution.17 Before
scrutinizing whether this is indeed the case, we will first consider the
case of exogenous locations.
4.2.1 Exogenous Locations
For exogenous (symmetric) locations, the regulator faces the following
problem:
max
p∈[c, p¯]
W = v + q ∗ (; ·) − t
12
+ t
4
 (1 − ) − 2K (q ∗(; ·)) − c.
Assuming an interior solution, the first-order condition for an optimal
price is given by18
∂W
∂p
= ∂q
∗(; ·)
∂p
[
1 − 2K ′(·)] = 0. (21)
Comparing with (20), we see that the optimal solution yields first-best
quality provision, as expected. The socially optimal levels of quality can
be achieved at all possible locations by imposing the appropriate price
level. Substituting K ′(·) = 12 into the first-order condition for the firms’
optimal quality investments, (5), we find that this price is given by
p∗(; ·) = c + t. (22)
An almost trivial, yet important, observation is that optimal price
regulation implies a price in excess of marginal production costs. A
positive mark-up is necessary in order to induce the firms to under-
take quality investments. More interesting, though, is the following
result.
Proposition 2: With exogenous symmetric locations, the optimal regu-
lated price is an increasing function of the distance between the firms.
Proof . Follows immediately from (22).
The intuition is relatively straightforward. Although the distance
between the firms influences the incentives for quality investments, the
socially optimal level of product quality is independent of locations. For
a given price, a larger distance between the firms reduces the intensity
17. Note that if the regulator could set location-specific prices, then the problem
becomes trivial in the sense that the first-best is always implementable.
18. The second-order condition is satisfied, since ∂
2W(p∗)
∂p2
= −2( ∂q∗(; ·)
∂p )
2 K ′′(·) < 0.
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of quality competition, and thus the equilibrium levels of quality. The
regulator can stimulate quality investments by increasing the price,
which increases the marginal revenue of such investments. Thus, the
further apart the firms are located, the higher is the price that is required
to provide the firms with sufficient incentives to invest at the socially
optimal quality level.
4.2.2 Endogenous Locations
If the firms are able to choose their locations, the regulator must take
into account how the regulated price affects not only quality but also
the choice of locations. From Proposition 1 we know that a higher
price induces higher quality and more horizontal differentiation. For
endogenous locations, the regulator faces the following problem:
max
p∈[c, p¯]
W = v + q ∗(·) − t
12
+ t
4
∗(·) [1 − ∗(·)] − 2K (q ∗(·)) − c.
Again, assuming an interior solution, the first-order condition for an
optimal price p∗ is given by19
∂W
∂p
= ∂q
∗(·)
∂p
[1 − 2K ′(·)] + t
4
∂∗(·)
∂p
[1 − 2∗(·)] = 0. (23)
The first-order condition for the second-best price is easily inter-
pretable: the first term represents the marginal social (net) benefit of
improved quality, whereas the second term is the marginal social benefit
of increased horizontal differentiation. The regulator has to weigh these
considerations against each other, and social welfare is maximized at
a price for which the sum of these two net marginal benefits equates
zero. Due to the monotonicity of q∗(·) and ∗(·), the first-best outcome
is achieved for a unique value of the transportation cost parameter. Let
this value be denoted by tˆ. From (23) we see that in general, for t 	= tˆ,
second-best regulation provides either too much quality provision and
an insufficient degree of differentiation, or vice versa. Assuming that
p∗(tˆ) < p¯, the efficiency properties of the second-best solution can be
more accurately characterized as follows.
Proposition 3: When locations are endogenous, the first-best outcome
is achieved only if t = tˆ. For t 	= tˆ, the second-best outcome is charac-
terized by (i) underinvestment in quality and too much differentiation if
19. We assume that the second-order condition is satisfied. This condition is given by
∂2W
∂p2
= ∂2q∗(·)
∂p2
[1 − 2K ′(·)] + t4 ∂
2∗(·)
∂p2
[1 − 2∗(·)] − 2[K ′′(·)( ∂q∗(·)
∂p )
2 + t4 ( ∂
∗(·)
∂p )
2] < 0.
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t < tˆ, and (ii) overinvestment in quality and insufficient differentiation if
t > tˆ.
Proof . On general form, the first-order condition for an optimal price
p∗ can be written as
∂W (∗(·), q ∗(·))
∂p
= ∂W(·)
∂
∗(·)
∂p
+ ∂W(·)
∂q
∂q ∗(·)
∂p
= 0. (24)
Let pˆ(t) be the price that induces first-best locations for any value of
t, that is, ∗( pˆ(t), t) = 12 . Equilibrium quality provision at this price is
then given by q ∗( pˆ(t), t). The relationship between q∗ and t—at the price
pˆ—is given by
dq ∗( pˆ(t), t)
dt
= ∂q
∗( pˆ(t), t)
∂p
dpˆ(t)
dt
+ ∂q
∗( pˆ(t), t)
∂t
. (25)
In order to determine the sign of dq
∗( pˆ(t),t)
dt , we need to find an expression
for dpˆ(t)dt . This can be found from the first-order condition for the firms’
optimal location choice at the price pˆ. From (11) this is given by
K ′(q ∗( pˆ, t))
K ′′(q ∗( pˆ, t))
= 1
4
t.
By total differentiation, and the use of (16) and (17), we can derive
dpˆ
dt
= 4(·)(p − c) + t
2
4t(·) . (26)
From (25) we can now derive
dq ∗( pˆ(t) , t)
dt
= 1
4(·)K′′(·) > 0.
Thus, there exists a tˆ such that q ∗( pˆ(t), t) is below (above) the first-best
level of quality provision if t < (>)tˆ.
Now consider the case of t > tˆ. Because q ∗( pˆ(t), t) is above first-
best, this means that ∂W(·)
∂q < 0 at q
∗( pˆ(t), t). From Proposition 1 we also
know that ∂
∗(·)
∂p > 0 and
∂q ∗(·)
∂p > 0. Furthermore, at  = 12 it follows that
∂W(·)
∂
= 0. Thus, we have that
∂W(·)
∂
∗(·)
∂p
+ ∂W(·)
∂q
∂q ∗(·)
∂p
< 0 at p = pˆ. (27)
Consequently, no p can ensure that ∂W(·)
∂
= ∂W(·)
∂q = 0. For the first-order
condition to hold, the first term in (27) must be positive. This can only
be achieved by setting p < pˆ, which yields ∗(·) < 12 and implies that
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∂W(·)
∂
> 0. The second-best outcome is thus achieved by setting a price
p∗, where ∂W(·)
∂
> 0 and ∂W(·)
∂q < 0 at the equilibrium pair (
∗(p∗), q∗(p∗)),
implying ∗(p∗) < 12 and q
∗(p∗) above first-best. By symmetry, the oppo-
site result applies for t < tˆ, and the first-best outcome is only achieved
at t = tˆ. 
In general, first-best locations can only be achieved at the cost
of a suboptimal level of quality from a social welfare viewpoint, and
vice versa. Consequently, the regulator faces a trade-off between quality
provision and horizontal differentiation in implementing the second-
best solution. Proposition 3 states that if it is sufficiently costly for
consumers to “travel” to a less-than-ideal location, then the second-
best solution is characterized by too much quality and insufficient
differentiation. For a sufficiently low value of t, the opposite result
applies.
The intuition for this result is related to the nature of the firms’
responses—in terms of both quality investments and relocations—to
changes in the regulated price. A price increase will induce the firms to
invest in a higher level of quality, and, as a response to increased quality
competition, the firms will also choose to differentiate more horizontally,
in order to dampen competition. We can call this the “competition effect”
and “centrifugal effect,” respectively. The characteristics of the second-
best equilibrium depend on the relative strength of these two effects.
If t is high (above tˆ), then the “centrifugal effect” is relatively weak,
because it only takes a small degree of horizontal differentiation in order
to dampen quality competition considerably. Consequently, the price
level necessary to induce first-best locations is so high that it provides
incentives for overinvestment in quality. The regulator can then do better
by balancing the considerations for quality provision and horizontal
differentiation at a lower price, which yields both overinvestment in
quality and an insufficient degree of differentiation. The opposite logic
applies for t < tˆ.
5. Optimal Regulation Under Partial Commitment
So far we have assumed that the regulator is able to commit to a
particular regulatory regime at the beginning of the game, before the
firms make their decisions. However, in some circumstances (e.g., in
the absence of long-term contracts), this may not be the most plausible
assumption. This is particularly the case if we interpret location in the
geographical space, since the physical location of a firm in most cases is
a decision for the very long term. When full commitment is not possible
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for the regulator, we may suspect that the equilibrium outcome will be
quite different and perhaps less desirable from a welfare point of view.
In this section we focus on the case of partial commitment, where
the regulator is not able to commit to a price before firms decide on
locations. Thus, the following game is considered
 Stage 1: The firms simultaneously choose locations x1 and x2.
 Stage 2: The regulator sets a price p.
 Stage 3: The firms simultaneously choose the quality levels q1 and q2.
From the discussion in Section 4 we know that the regulator in this
case will set a price that induces a socially optimal supply of quality. This
price is given by (22), with the corresponding equilibrium quality level
given by (20).20
Now, at the first stage of the game, each firm simultaneously
chooses its location, anticipating the optimal regulated price. When
location decisions are made prior to price setting, the firms must take
into account not only how location decisions affect the intensity of
quality competition, but also how the regulated price is influenced. The
following result obtains.
Proposition 4: Under partial commitment, the second-best price regula-
tion induces first-best quality provision and maximal horizontal differentia-
tion.
Proof . For any pair of locations, the regulator will set a price that
induces first-best quality levels. From (22), we know that this price is
given by p∗(; ·) = c + t. At stage 1, the firms’ profit functions are thus
given by
π1(x1, x2) = 12 t
(
x22 − x21
) − K (q1),
π2(x1, x2) = (x2 − x1)t − 12 t
(
x22 − x21
) − K (q2).
Because quality levels are fixed at the first-best level, and q1 = q2,
the first-order conditions for the firms’ location choices are given by
∂π1/∂x1 = −tx1 and ∂π2/∂x2 = t(1 − x2), which implies that there is
a unique equilibrium where the firms choose locations x1 = 0 and
x2 = 1. 
Because the regulator is able to set a price that induces first-best
quality for all possible locations, the firms’ location choices have no
20. Note that with this sequence of moves, we cannot impose symmetry ex ante in the
welfare maximization problem. However, since the firms’ quality choices depend only
on the distance between the firms, (22) yields first-best quality provision for all possible
location pairs.
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longer any effect on the intensity of quality competition when prices can
be adjusted after these choices have been made. Thus, location choices
are now only determined by the effects on revenues. As before, a firm
can, ceteris paribus, steal market shares by relocating in the direction of
the competitor. However, closer locations also mean that the regulator
will reduce the price in order to dampen quality competition and
thus keep the supply of quality at the first-best level. Obviously, this
reduces the revenue gain of locating closer to the competitor. Thus, in
contrast to the case of full commitment, the incentives to differentiate
horizontally are not caused by a desire to avoid fierce head-on quality
competition. Horizontal differentiation is rather a strategy for firms to
achieve a higher regulated price, since the optimal price increases in
distance. In fact, Proposition 4 shows that optimal regulation under
partial commitment yields maximal differentiation, implying that the
degree of horizontal differentiation is inefficiently high, compared with
the first-best outcome.
Even if full regulatory commitment is not possible, regulation is
still socially beneficial because the supply of quality is more efficient.
However, social welfare under partial commitment will be (weakly)
lower than under full commitment. The reason is straightforward: under
full commitment, the regulator can always pick the same policy as
under partial commitment. The regulator’s ability to trade off qual-
ity benefits against locational benefits enables her to improve social
welfare.
6. Extension: Unequal Weights on Consumers’
and Producers’ Surplus
So far we have assumed that the regulator places equal weights on
consumers’ and producers’ surplus. However, in several industries this
may not be the most appropriate assumption. For instance, in health
care markets the regulator (or third-party payer) may place a larger
weight on patients’ welfare than on providers’ profits when setting the
optimal price. A welfare function encompassing such considerations is,
assuming symmetry, the following:
W =
∫ 1
0
U (z, q , ) dz + α (π1 + π2) , where 0 < α < 1,
which leads to the following modification of (18):
W = v + q − t
12
+ t
4
 (1 − ) − p (1 − α) − α (c + 2K (q )) . (28)
There are two interesting observations we can make from (28). First,
we see that a lower weight on profits relative to consumers’ surplus,
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implies less concern for the firms’ production and quality costs. Second,
the price now enters the welfare function directly. This is because $1 in
the consumers’ (or regulator’s) hand is of larger value than $1 in the
firms’ hand, implying that the absolute size of the regulated price now
matters.
Considering the first-best solution, it is straightforward to show
that this requires locations at the quartiles, as before. However, first-
best quality provision is now higher, as the marginal social (net) benefit
of quality improvements is inversely related to α. The first-best supply
of quality is now given by K ′(·) = 12α .
In a second-best world, a lower weight on profits relative to
consumers’ surplus complicates matters. In fact, when the price is
the only instrument to implement optimal quality and location, the
regulator faces a trade-off between inducing high quality and at the same
time keep prices low. To make this clear, consider the full commitment
game analyzed in Sections 3 and 4. The regulator’s problem is now to
maximize (28) with respect to p, anticipating the firms’ responses in
terms of quality and location choices, as defined by (5) and (11). This
gives us the following first-order condition:
∂W
∂p
= ∂q
∗(·)
∂p
[1 − α2K ′(·)] + t
4
∂∗(·)
∂p
[1 − 2∗(·)] − (1 − α) = 0.
Let us first consider the most extreme case where the regulator
places no weight on profits, α = 0. As the regulator is not concerned
about the costs of quality provision, she may be tempted to increase the
price (above the second-best price at α = 1) in order to improve quality.
But, although there are no quality costs to offset gains from quality
provision, increasing the price may come at a cost. First, there is a direct
welfare loss from price increases (α < 1). Second, a price increase also
affects the degree of horizontal differentiation. The social desirability
of the latter effect depends on whether there initially was too much or
too little horizontal differentiation.21 The impact of α on the second-
best outcome is thus generally ambiguous. However, it can be shown
that ∂W
∂p |α=1 > ∂W∂p |0<α<1 if ∂q
∗(.)
∂p 2K
′(·) < 1. If marginal quality costs are
sufficiently small and if the equilibrium level of quality is sufficiently
unresponsive to price changes, then the optimal regulated price is lower
if the regulator is more concerned about consumers’ surplus than about
the profits of the firms, that is, p∗|0<α<1 < p∗|α=1 . In this case, a social
planner acting (more) on behalf of consumers induces lower quality and
21. Note that the second-best optimum may now involve both insufficient quality
provision and insufficient horizontal differentiation.
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less product differentiation in equilibrium than a social planner without
any distributional concerns.
7. Concluding Remarks
The markets for medical care and (higher) education are examples where
prices are often not feasible means of competition. When there is no
possibility of competing in prices, firms will resort to other variables
to increase market shares. One obvious dimension is the quality of
the product offered (e.g., medical care or schooling). In addition to
quality competition, or vertical product differentiation, there may also
be horizontal differentiation. The latter may refer to either product
differentiation (specialization) or the physical locations of firms.
In this paper we have analyzed, using a spatial duopoly model,
the strategic interaction between firms that first determine the horizon-
tal characteristics of their goods and then compete in quality. When
products are close substitutes, quality competition will be intense. The
main feature of our model is that firms can dampen quality competition
by making their products less substitutable. The degree of horizontal
differentiation is thus determined by the intensity of quality competi-
tion, which in turn is determined by the firms’ price-cost margins and
by transportation and investment costs.
Like in most sequential games, the regulator’s commitment power
is crucial for the outcome of the game. We analyzed two versions
of the basic model, namely, full and partial commitment. With full
commitment, the regulator sets the price prior to location and quality
decisions. The resulting second-best solution optimally trades off verti-
cal and horizontal differentiation incentives. As there are two regulatory
goals and only one regulatory variable, the second-best solution will, in
general, fall short of the first-best optimum. We found that there will be
insufficient quality provision but too much differentiation when quality
competition is intense (i.e., when transportation costs are low).
In cases where the regulator fails to obtain full commitment power,
firms anticipate the regulators’ incentive to change the price in the
course of the game. We considered the case where the price is set after
location decisions have been made but prior to quality investments. As
the regulator is then only concerned with quality, efficient investment
decisions will be implemented. However, this leads firms to “game”
the regulator. The price necessary to induce efficient quality provision
increases in the degree of horizontal differentiation, as the higher price
must compensate for relaxed quality competition. Thus, with only
partial commitment power at the hand of the regulator, we showed
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that this always results in excessive horizontal differentiation, from the
viewpoint of social welfare.
Finally, some remarks should be made about a couple of the
fundamental assumptions on which the analysis rests. A key assumption
is the noncontractibility of the vertical and horizontal dimensions of the
good. Without this assumption, the regulatory problem would—in a
world of perfect information—be somewhat trivial. However, for hard-
to-define goods like medical care and schooling, nonverifiability of the
vertical and horizontal dimensions is typically an intrinsic feature. In
these cases, we show that optimal regulation must often negotiate a
trade-off between encouraging the supply of higher-quality goods and
reducing excessive horizontal differentiation in the market. This trade-
off arises because of the strategic interaction between competing firms’
incentives for horizontal and vertical differentiation. The presence of this
strategic interaction depends on the other key assumption of the model,
namely that consumers’ transportation costs are strictly convex, which
implies that horizontal differentiation has a dampening effect on quality
competition. Although this effect does not rely on the only plausible
assumption about consumers’ transportation costs, we nevertheless find
it intuitively appealing.
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